I
Johnson-Laird is surely right when he discerns three mutually exclusive positions in current thinking concerning the relationship between human mentality and computation (1987: 252) . He suggests that the only alternative to these three positions is that consciousness is not 'scientifically explicable' (ibid.).
(1) The human brain (or, variously, mind or mindbrain) is a computer, equivalent to some Turing machine.
There are, of course, innumerable fine-grained renderings of this theory: the brain is variously thought to be a digital computer, an analogue computer, a stored-program machine, a program-controlled machine, a massively parallel distributed processor, etc.
(2) The activity of a human brain can be simulated perfectly by a Turing machine but the brain is not itself a computing machine.
Analogies offered in the literature include hurricanes, the motion of the planets around the sun, and the digestion of pizza. None of these phenomena is itself computational in nature yet, supposedly, all can be simulated perfectly by a Turing machine (in the sense that the machine can compute descriptions of the phenomena to any desired number of decimal places and on any temporal grid). (2) is Searle's position (1992 Searle's position ( , 1997 .
(3) The brain's cognitive activity cannot in its entirety be simulated by a computing machine: a complete account of cognition will need 'to rely on non-computable procedures ' (Johnson-Laird 1987: 252) . Penrose (1994) maintains a version of (3) which is so strong that it is not entailed by the conjunction of the negations of (1) and (2).
I shall be arguing that (1)- (3) O-machines (section II) are digital computing machines. They generate digital output from digital input by means of a step-by-step procedure consisting of repeated applications of a small, fixed number of primitive operations, the procedure unfolding under the control of a finite program of instructions which is stored internally in the form of data on the machine's tape. Thus even if (1) is false, the theory that the brain is a computing machine might nevertheless be true. Furthermore, the success of hypothesis (4) would vindicate functionalism. As with Turing machines, the description of an O-machine is silent about the underlying hardware.
I I
Turing introduced the concept of an O-machine in his PhD thesis (Princeton, 1938) . Geroch and Hartle 1986; Komar 1964; Kreisel 1967 Kreisel , 1974 Penrose 1989 Penrose , 1994 Pour-El 1974; Pour-El and Richards 1979, 1981; Scarpellini 1963; Stannett 1990; Vergis et al 1986) . If such processes do exist then perhaps future engineers will use them to implement the non-classical part of some O-machine.
Science fiction or not, this theorizing suffices to illustrate why it is an empirical matter whether or not the disjunction of hypotheses (1) and (2) is true.
I I I
Not so according to John Searle. Searle believes that it follows from Church's thesis, itself a broadly logical claim, that the activity of the brain Searle's statement of Church's thesis is mistaken. Church's thesis (also known as 'Turing's thesis' and the 'Church-Turing thesis' (Church 1936 , Turing 1936 , Kleene 1967 ) is a proposition concerning the extent of what can be achieved by a human mathematician who is unaided by any machinery save paper and pencil, and who is working in accordance with 'mechanical' methods, which is to say, methods set out in the form of a finite number of exact instructions that call for no insight or ingenuity on the part of the person who is carrying them out. The Church-Turing thesis states that whatever can be calculated by a mathematician so working, even a mathematician idealised to the extent of being free of all constraints on time, patience, concentration, and so forth, can also be calculated by a Turing machine. Trivially, the processing of an O-machine is always characterisable as a set of steps, namely, the set of steps specified by the machine's program.
Employing the thesis espoused by Searle yields the absurdity that an Omachine can be simulated by a Turing machine. Searle's attempt to recruit Church's thesis in support of (2) is entirely fallacious.
An O-machine's program may call for primitive operations that a human clerk working by rote and unaided by machinery is incapable of carrying out (for otherwise, by the real Church-Turing thesis, whatever can be calculated by an O-machine can be calculated by a Turing machine -a contradiction). It follows that there is no possibility of Searle's Chinese room argument being successfully deployed against the new functionalism offered by hypothesis (4) (which Searle will presumably find as 'anti-biological' as other functionalisms). This argument (Searle 1980 (Searle , 1989 output are functionally well-behaved enough to be describable by ... mathematical relationships ... we know that some specific version of a Turing machine will be able to mimic them' (Guttenplan 1994: 595) . Also typical are the following:
If a mental process can be functionally defined as an operation on symbols, there is a Turing machine capable of carrying out the computation. (Fodor 1981: 130; see also 1983: 38-39 .) a n y process which can be formalised so that it can be represented as a series of instructions for the manipulation of discrete elements can, at least in principle, be reproduced by [a universal Turing machine]. (Dreyfus 1992: 72.) The logical availability of hypothesis (4) gives the lie to all of these claims. symbol-processing machine is more general than the notion of a Turing machine.
I V
As is well known, Penrose argues on the basis of formal results due to Gödel and Turing that propositions (1) and (2) are false (1989, 1990, 1994) .
In a section of the latter rather inconspicuously positioned in the midst of a chapter on quantum theory and the brain (1994, chapter 7, section 9), Penrose explains that his argument can be extended to apply to oracle machines: the arguments of Part I of this book can be applied equally well against an oracle-machine model of mathematical understanding as they were against the Turing-machine model, almost without change. (1994: 380; see also 1996, sects 3.10, 13.2.) This is why, in section I, I described Penrose's version of the anticomputationalist hypothesis (3) as being sufficiently strong as to be not entailed by the conjunction of the negations of (1) Penrose does hint at a way out:
[I]t need not be the case that human mathematical understanding is in principle as powerful as a n y oracle machine at all. ... [T]he conclusion G [human mathematicians are not using a knowably sound algorithm in order to ascertain mathematical truth] does n o t necessarily imply that human insight is powerful enough, in principle, to solve each instance of the halting problem. Thus, we need not necessarily conclude that the physical laws that we seek reach, in principle, beyond every computable level of oracle machine (or even reach the first order). We need only seek something that is not equivalent to a n y specific oracle machine (including also the zerot h -order machines, which are Turing 1 4 machines). Physical laws could perhaps lead to something that is just different. (1994: 381.) On that enigmatic note Penrose leaves it. Just when we seem to be approaching a crucial part of the exposition, he suddenly falls silent. What, indeed, does Penrose mean here?
It is natural to think of the functions, or problems, that are solvable by a first-order oracle machine as being harder that those solvable by Turing machine, and those solvable by a second-order oracle machine as being harder still, and so forth. (To say that a Turing machine or O-machine 'solves a problem' is to say that when the machine is given the problem, suitably encoded, on its tape it halts with the answer, 1 (Yes) or 0 (No), under its head.) It is customary in recursion theory to say that a class of problems of equal hardness are of the same degree. Problems that are solvable by Turing machine are said to be of degree 0. Let me write 1 for the degree of problems that are solvable by a first-order oracle machine (but not by Turing machine). It is known that there are degrees between 0 and 1 (Friedberg 1957 , Sacks 1964 Simpson 1977 is a survey of the area). That is to say, there are classes of problems that are too hard to be solved by Turing machine and yet are less hard than some of the problems that a first-order oracle machine can solve. Here 'less hard' has the precise sense that while a first-order machine can solve any of the problems in such a class, an O-machine that is equipped only with an oracle for delivering the solutions ('Yes' or 'No') to problems in that class is unable to solve every problem that the first-order machine can solve. This notion of degrees lying between 0 and 1 seems to make sense of much of what Penrose says about what it is that he seeks (although certainly not of the specific claim that 'it need not be the case that human mathematical understanding is in principle 1 5 as powerful as any oracle machine at all'). For some degree between 0 and 1, the 'physics of mind' is exactly that hard. This is certainly a coherent position; and for all that anyone presently knows, such may in fact be the case. 
